Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 3

1992

Article 12

Horacio A. Grigera Naón, Choice-of-Law
Problems in International Commercial
Regulation
Joseph T. McLaughlin∗

∗

Copyright c 1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Horacio A. Grigera Naón, Choice-of-Law
Problems in International Commercial
Regulation
Joseph T. McLaughlin

Abstract
In Professor Grigera Naon’s latest work, Choice-of-law Problems in International Commercial
Arbitration, he attempts to “analyze diverse aspects of international commercial arbitration so as
to determine to what extent arbitral tribunals are willing to perform the independent role ascribed
to them by lex mercatoria theoreticians, namely, the creation of an autonomous, anational and
all-prevailing international commercial law.”
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In Professor Grigera Na6n's latest work, Choice-of-law
Problems in International Commercial Arbitration,1 he attempts to
"analyze diverse aspects of international commercial arbitration so as to determine to what extent arbitral tribunals are
willing to perform the independent role ascribed to them by lex
mercatoria theoreticians, namely, the creation of an autonomous, anational and all-prevailing international commercial
law." 2 This introduction is as broad as the scope of international arbitration itself. Professor Grigera Na6n's lofty ambition is somewhat blunted, however, by the complexity of his
thoughts and ponderous writing style. While the title of the
book suggests a relatively discrete field of study, the author follows virtually every available detour onto complicated pathways of international law, policy, national court systems, and
the theoretical bases for that "Alice in Wonderland" doctrine
known as lex mercatoria.3
The book's strongest point is its description of choice-oflaw methodologies in various countries throughout the world.4
The author's analysis of these methodologies is quite extensive, spanning nearly 150 pages.5 Professor Grigera Na6n dissects the choice-of-law rules followed by some of the world's
major commercial powers including the United States, 6 the
United Kingdom,7 the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 and, cu* Partner, Sherman & Sterling, New York City; Adjunct Professor, Fordham
University School of Law; B.A. 1965, Boston College; J.D. 1968, Cornell Law School.
The author wishes to thank Schuyler Carroll, Esq. for his assistance in preparing this
Review.
1.HORACio A. GRIGERA NA6N, CHOICE-OF-LAw PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1992) [hereinafter CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 26-37.
4. Id. at 153-284.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 168.
7. Id.at 161.
8. Id. at 210.

946

CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS

947

riously, Argentina.9 He continues with a discussion of the Socialist systems, from (former) Soviet jurisprudence to the law
of the People's Republic of China, particularly in the context of
their commercial relations with non-Socialist countries.' 0
In his quest to make the point that parties should not be
completely free to choose what law should apply to their commercial relations, Professor Grigera Na6n examines a number
of legal systems, including the law of the United Kingdom.''
He begins by noting that "[i]f taken literally, the proper law
doctrine [United Kingdom's prevailing choice-of-law doctrine]
would embody a recognition of the absolute freedom of the
parties to choose the applicable law even if the law so chosen
has no connection with the transaction or the dispute."' 2 The
author's tone suggests a certain distrust of such freedom. He
then analyzes the relevant U.K. law with a discussion of the
seminal case of Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. '" In Vita,
Lord Wright held the parties' express statement as to choiceof-law conclusive "provided the intention expressed is bonafide
and legal."' 4 Professor Grigera Na6n then points out that the
"bonafide and legal" requirement requires reference to a legal
order, possibly different than that chosen by the parties, in order to determine whether this requirement has been met.' 5
From this the author concludes that compulsory limitations
may be imposed on choice-of-law provisions in order to balance the interests of the contracting parties and "the concerns
of third parties and of communities connected with the transaction."16

Absent examples, which the author does not offer, it is difficult to criticize his abstract conclusions. Surely most members of the international legal community would agree that the
parties' contractual autonomy is limited in certain basic respects, for example, an agreement to bribe a public official is
9. Id. at 187.
10. Id. at 179-87.
11. Id. at 161-67.
12. Id. at 162.

13. Id. (citing Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., 1 All E.R. 513 (Privy
Council 1939).

14. Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., 1 All E.R. 513, 521 (Privy Council
1939).
15. CHOICE-OF-LAw PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 164.
16. Id.
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not enforceable. However, notwithstanding Professor Grigera
Na6n's fondness for abstract theories of choice-of-law limitations, the parties' choice-of-law should not be subjected to indiscriminate attack based upon unspecified "concerns of third
parties" if there is to be the necessary predictability in the international business community.
Professor Grigera Na6n, however, does point out a
number of ways in which the U.K. courts have restricted the
freedom of the contracting parties to choose the applicable
law. 7 One such example is the courts' policy of holding a contract invalid if it would be invalid under the law of the place of
performance when the place of performance is other than the
United Kingdom.1 8 The author concludes his discussion of the
U.K. choice-of-law approach by noting that it is "compatible
with emerging functionally-oriented methodologies in the
field."' 9
The author's analysis of the choice-of-law rules of the
United States includes a discussion of methodologies used to
choose the applicable law when the parties have not agreed on
what law would apply to any disputes. 20 This is the only instance where the author extensively discusses the issue of
choice-of-law in the absence of an expressed intent by the parties to the contract. Here, also, in discussing U.S. law, Professor Grigera Na6n makes what might well be his most telling
point: that each forum, in cases of true conflict with competing
policies of equal force, will apply its own law. 2 1 Such an observation should come as no surprise to international practitioners because judges and arbitrators are generally more familiar
with the law of their home state and thus more likely to apply
it, given any choice in the matter.
Professor Grigera Na6n also discusses the sharp contrast
between the classic socialist and capitalist positions on freedom to choose the applicable law:
It is in the sector of relations between socialist and capitalist enterprises where socialist laws allow greater freedom
17. Id. at 165-66.
18. Id. at 166.

19. Id. at 167.
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id. at 171.
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to contractual autonomy and choice-of-law stipulations because there is a general consciousness of the differences in
the social, political and economic systems to which the parties belong and the impossibility of insisting upon certain
conceptions and institutions of the internal law of socialist
nations in international transactions with capitalistic partners. In this sense, we seem to be confronted, although to a
greater degree, with the same phenomenon observed when
analyzing French and American law: the impossibility of extending the application of certain mandatory rules for domestic transactions to the sphere of international exchanges. This does not however imply a general willingness
of socialist parties to submit their transactions with capitalist counterparts to a foreign law. Rather, on the contrary,
they try to require through choice-of-law stipulations that
their own special legislation, practices, customs and usages
concerning international trade and economic relations govern their contracts.2 2
Thus, the prevailing (former) Soviet school of thought on
choice-of-law attempts to promote (former) Soviet commerce,
notwithstanding the fact that the legal analysis required may
not always remain consistent.23 Ironically, there appears to be
a strong similarity between (former) Soviet law and that of the
United States on choice-of-law. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that "parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit."' 4
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland StanfordJunior University, the Court focused upon the parties' freedom to contract with complete autonomy, including
agreements to submit any disputes to arbitration, to select a
specific forum for the arbitration or to allow some claims to be
decided by arbitration and some by judicial proceedings. 5
Ironically, (former) Soviet law also focuses upon the parties'
freedom to contract as to choice-of-law. As Professor Grigera
Na6n notes, however, this is true only because in most cases
22. Id. at 185.
23. Recent events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have outrun

the author's ability to keep his extensive discussion of "Socialist Systems" current.
This portion of the book already reads like a historical study rather than a topical
analysis.
24. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
25. Id.
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the parties have agreed that (former) Soviet law will apply and
the arbitrators believe this will benefit (former) Soviet commerce.2 6 The parties' freedom to contract would not be so
easily upheld in a case where a different forum or a different
law was chosen. This results in an inability to create an anational lex mercatoria or general principles of law superseding national law, as to which the author expresses his dissatisfaction.2 7
One might fairly question the support Professor Grigera
Na6n gives to either a lex mercatoria or a superseding general or
anational law. These two amorphous doctrines are more conceptual myth than reality. Both provide arguments for undermining clear, unambiguous contractual choice-of-law clauses
that, absent fraud, simply reflect the informed will of the parties. These mythical doctrines similarly allow one party to seek
to avoid the application of the law freely chosen, despite the
fact that the parties' intent was clearly expressed in their original contract.
It is precisely because the (former) Socialist systems have
allowed a lex mercatoria to develop that non-Socialist parties
can, or at least could in the past, freely contract with parties in
these countries, because in so doing the non-Socialist parties
could rely upon the contract's choice-of-law clause. This in
turn allows the parties to plan for disputes that may arise, to
consult legal advisors as to their obligations under the contract, and to take appropriate steps, if necessary, to protect
their rights under the law applicable to the contract. By contrast, if, in Professor Grigera Na6n's brave new world, the general principles of the lex mercatoria applied, the parties would be
severely disadvantaged because they could not accurately assess their legal rights and obligations nor predict their ultimate
exposure in the event of a dispute.
Professor Grigera Na6n neatly summarizes the choice-oflaw principles of Argentina, especially where the parties have
not selected the applicable law in their contract.2 8 In the case
of "contracts already performed or to be performed outside of
the place of contracting they will always be governed by the
26. CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 187.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 189-90.
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law of the place of performance. ' 29 The general rule in Argentina, however, is that the law of the place of concluding the
contract will govern contracts made outside Argentina.30 This
provision in essence allows, as the author later points out, the
parties to make a choice-of-law without including a specific
clause in the contract denominated as such.3 The author also
advocates a practical method of determining the applicable
place of performance.3 2 This method looks to the facts of each
contract as a whole on a case by case basis.3 3
After his discussion of Argentine choice-of-law principles,
Professor Grigera Na6n comments on the doctrinesfraude d la
loi and "abuse of rights," both of which limit the parties' autonomy in their choice-of-law. 4 Both doctrines are grounded
in the notion that there are general principles of morality and
justice that private parties cannot ignore when they enter into
contractual relations. Once again, it is difficult to criticize the
author's espousal of an abstract principle of general applicability, but it is difficult to assess the impact of such theories without specific examples which the author is not inclined to offer.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the parties are
granted fundamental freedom to choose the applicable law or
forum. 3 5 However, in some cases German courts have re-

quired some contact between the law and the transaction. 6
Like Argentine law, there are limits in Germany that require
the application of "public policy" and "lois de police" (international mandatory rules) limitations to the parties' freedom to
make a choice-of-law. 7 As Professor Grigera Na6n points out,
these restrictions in Germany are similar tofraude d la loi doctrine as well as the "abuse of rights" doctrine in other countries.3 8
Professor Grigera Na6n's discussion of French law in this
area seems somewhat repetitive of his prior analysis of the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See id. at 189-97.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 197-204.
See id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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French choice-of-law rules. 39 In his analysis of a French statutory provision giving broad authority to the French courts to
review arbitral awards (both foreign and domestic), the author
notes that this scope of review will allow the parties or the arbitrators to choose lex mercatoria or general principles of law. 40
The author concludes that this freedom of choice "entitles arbitrators directly to designate the law they deem applicable
without having to refer to a particular body of private interna41
tional law which would justify that choice."
Such an argument does not support the freedom of the
parties to choose a particular law to govern their contract, nor
does it provide comfort to those who, quite rightly, seek some
certainty in their international commercial relationships.
Sadly, the author does not consider these critical points, but
rather resorts to the somewhat mythical lex mercatoria and general notions of "ordre public international" to explain his concept
of freedom to choose an applicable law. 4 2
After his discussion of choice-of-law principles, Professor
Grigera Na6n presents a section entitled "State Controls Over
Arbitral Agreements, Proceedings and Awards." '4 3 This section explores the degree of control that states retain over international arbitration within their territorial jurisdiction. Once
again, the analysis focuses upon a number of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
The author's discussion of U.S. law is particularly extensive and detailed, concluding with praise for the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., where the Court upheld the arbitration of an antitrust claim arising out of a transnational contract where the
arbitration was to be held in Japan.4 4 Professor Grigera Na6n
concludes that "the Supreme Court did weigh conflicting interests both for and against the arbitrability of certain disputes,
thus observing a functional choice-of-law methodology for
39. Id. at 155-61.
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 230.
43. Id. at 219.
44. Id. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
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finding a principled solution for the specific issue at stake." 45
His discussion analyzes a number of other cases integral to the
development of U.S. law in this area, including M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 46 and Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co. 47
While Professor Grigera Na6n's analysis of choice-of-law
methodologies is extensive and detailed, his book suffers from
some important flaws. The author's style at times becomes intolerably obtuse and complex. The author often combines
many different and complicated ideas into a single sentence
that runs on, and on and on.
To a certain extent, this text suffers from a lack of focus on
a specific audience. The bulk of the book, an analysis of
choice-of-law methodologies, provides useful background on
the topic under the laws of major commercial countries. The
forty-four page Table of Citations4 is a useful collection of the
relevant literature, legislation, and arbitral awards, although
with two or three exceptions, the sources are all dated 1989 or
earlier. However, in the end the author gives limited assistance to one who is looking to the book for what its title suggests, i.e., solutions, or at least a discussion of, the practical
problems of choice-of-law in international commercial arbitration.49
The section of the book describing choice-of-law methodologies for international commercial arbitration is plagued
with textual problems which drive the reader to multiple foreign language dictionaries and, ultimately, to distraction. The
author makes extensive use of phrases and lengthy quotations
in a number of languages (e.g., Italian, German, Spanish, and
French) other than English. Although an international law text
should, by definition, be written for an international audience,
an English language book should not require a multi-lingual
translator to interpret the text for the presumably intended
English-speaking audience.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 240.
at 233 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
(citing Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
at 293-337.
at 285-91.

